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A B S T R A C T
Empathy is understood as a mode of understanding operating on a subconscious
level of mental processing. The cognitive element can only abstractly be distinguished
from its affective expression. When recognizing a fellow creature we involuntarily sym-
pathize with it. Recognition of covert motivations of overt behavior is the first step in for-
mation of a communication channel between two (or more) empathizing agents. Yet,
since communication evolved in variably complex social environments it was subject to
pressure of conflicting individual interests. Deception thus evolved as an adaptive evo-
lutionary strategy. Empathic understanding does not necessarily entail recognition of
agent’s real intentions. Deception may be achieved on both conscious and unconscious
processing levels. A sufficient degree of biopsychosocial maturity must be reached for a
child to be able to independently recognize verbal and non-verbal communication fi-
nesses. Once this level has been attained, the prevailing emotional orientation deter-
mines his/her degree of empathizing competence.
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Introduction
There is a growing consensus in the
contemporary science of the mind that
empathy is a mode of understanding. To
be sure, it is a very rudimentary mode of
»understanding« occurring typically on a
subconscious, »pre-predicative« level of
mental processing, and involving not only
cognitive but affective states/events as
well. The idea of connecting human em-
pathy to understanding and communi-
cation can be traced back to a prominent
school of early twentieth century Euro-
pean philosophy (Dilthey, Lipps, Husserl,
Scheler, E. Stein, Merleau-Ponty)1,2. Ac-
cording to these authors, there exists a
special mode of object-oriented (»inten-
tional«) consciousness – called Einfüh-
lung or 'empathy' – pertaining only to a
particular class of objects of our every-
-day cognitions/actions: primarily to our
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fellow human beings, extendable presum-
ably to some other living creatures too.*
But if we humans really are endowed
with a separate mental faculty, enabling
us to experience »animate objects« differ-
ently from all other things in the world –
stones, trees, tea-pots, cars (even artifi-
cial minds, for that matter) – what makes
the phenomenal difference, and how does
it come about?
According to the aforementioned thin-
kers, the non-voluntary, intuitive »under-
standing« of an »Other« occurs »through«
the observer’s experience of Other’s phys-
ical appearance. Relying on a pre-con-
scious intuition that the object of our at-
tention possesses mental life similar to
our own, we literally see his/her/its living
body (Germ. Leib, in contrast to Körper,
the purely physical body) as a »sign of a
mind«. In such an empathic experience
the cognitive element can only abstractly,
i.e., upon reflection, be distinguished
from its affective expression. In our ev-
ery-day encounter with the world, when
recognizing a fellow creature we – simul-
taneously and involuntarily – sympathize
with him/her/it: we undergo a »feeling for
others«, a »fellow-feeling«. However – and
this is one of the crucial tenets of »exis-
tential phenomenology« – sympathy (also
called Ocompassion’) is not to be thought
of as inner-life affair, taking place solely
inside our skulls, but rather as an »em-
bodied« type of experience – as a mental
event with bodily manifestations. It is
this feature of empathy that makes it a
prerequisite of both non-verbal and verbal
communication. For, if we wouldn’t »wear«
our beliefs, desires, and intentions »on
our sleeves« – as we typically do – they
would hardly ever be recognized by oth-
ers.
The mutual recognition of covert men-
tal motivations of overt bodily movements
can thus be regarded as the first step in
the formation of a communication chan-
nel between two (or more) organisms/em-
pathizing agents. My empathizing ability
enables me to understand Other’s bodily
movements intentionally motivated, i.e.,
as »actions« – physical expressions of in-
tentional mind; the same ability enabling
the Other to understand my bodily move-
ments in the same manner. It is thereby
crucial to note that empathic understand-
ing does not necessarily entail recogni-
tion of agent’s real intentions. As one can
falsely understand a language sentence,
ascribing to it false meaning – i.e., false
communicative intention(s) of its utterer
– so can a piece of behavior be misunder-
stood too. Moreover, it is sometimes in
agent’s best interest to elicit false under-
standing of his/her/its actions/intentions,
whereby the mechanism of effecting such
an interpretation – the deception mecha-
nism – does not have to operate on a con-
scious level. One can deceive unintention-
ally. Whether such unconscious deception
involves a kind of self-deception is an-
other, more complicated matter.
It is striking how many of the philo-
sophical insights into empathy, understan-
ding and communication anticipate, and
are congruent with, contemporary research
in brain and behavioral sciences. It is
moreover obvious that full appreciation of
the importance of empathy for communi-
cation should have consequences for the
communication theory. On the other side,
in the broad framework of cognitive sci-
ence, embracing a host of very different
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* This type of consciousness was considered to be the distinctive feature, of human mental life – a fact that, as
indicated by some philosophers (e.g., Dilthey), was bound to have methodological consequences for all the
disciplines dealing with humans and human products. It is this methodological autonomy of the human sci-
ences or – to use the original term – »mind sciences« (Geisteswissenschaften) that served – and still serves –
as a justification for their sharp differentiation from the natural sciences.
disciplines, the scientists’ efforts are cen-
tered on three, mutually related, groups
of problems: 1) evolutionary origins of the
phenomenon3,4; 2) its developmental as-
pects5–7; and 3) its neurobiological under-
pinnings.8–14 It should be noted that this
research is to a great extent complemen-
tary to ethical approaches to empathy: to
those analyses and explanations that treat
empathy as a morally relevant concept –
both from a proscriptive (normative) and
the descriptive (factual) point of view.15
This is not surprising since there is grow-
ing evidence for the hypothesis that ac-
quiring a »sense of others«, as a principal
moral virtue and a cornerstone of social
life, is but a higher developmental stage
of »primitive« empathic affects encoun-
tered both by several mammalian species
and human infants. Evolutionary biolo-
gists, evolutionary psychologists, etholo-
gists, philosophers of biology, and other
students of behavior share a conviction
that the study of empathy presents an
important appendix to the game-theoreti-
cal approach to the notorious problem of
altruistic behavior. What these scientists
actually hope for is that their research
will provide a missing link to the expla-
nation of conditions under which coopera-
tive behavior could have, or perhaps even
has, evolved.
Although there are obvious and non-
trivial differences between the two men-
tioned approaches to empathy – starting
from the fact that contemporary authors
define empathy in much more precise (i.e.,
empirically verified) terms than the ones
employed by the early 20th century phi-
losophers – there remains a shared as-
pect of this notion latently present in
both intellectual traditions. In order to
capture the common element, we will un-
derstand empathy in a rather broad sense:
as a non-voluntary, sub-conscious process
of »affective understanding« of other’s men-
tal states/events, in respect to a particu-
lar situational/behavioral context. Despite
its vagueness we find this characteriza-
tion suitable for the purposes of this pa-
per.
There is an apt metaphor that has
gained popularity in recent literature –
the metaphor of »mind-reading«. Used
more or less as a technical term, this ex-
pression refers to the cognitive aspect of
empathy. Our ability to recognize, predict
and affect intentions and, ipso facto, be-
havior of others (the »others« not neces-
sarily belonging to our own species) is a
fairly universal evolutionary adaptation,
a faculty that adult humans share not
only with newborns of their own species,
but with adult members of certain other
species too. While there is little disagree-
ment about the adaptive advantages of
possessing mind-reading abilities (the
most important advantage consisting in
taking up an »intentional stance« in rela-
tion to a kin organism, instead of a far
more impractical and far more costly »phy
sical« or an intermediate »design stan-
ce«), the way this faculty actually works –
with special regard to the recently estab-
lished neuro-anatomic constraints – is a
matter of heated debates. Among a host
of different attitudes and models, two
principal positions can be discerned: the
»theory-theory« (TT) and the »simulation-
-theory« (ST).
TT is based on an assumption that all
humans, and presumably some other
mammals too, posses a kind of primitive,
»naive« conceptual system – a theory of
mind, as it were, also known as »folk-psy-
chology«**. This »theory« is comparable to
an analogous implicit »theory« of the
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** The basic entities of this »theory« are beliefs, thoughts, wishes, hopes, desires, envies, etc. Since these differ-
ent »attitudes« can be expressed (represented) through the same representational form – the form of a lan-
guage-like entity known as »proposition« – they are called »propositional attitudes«.
physical world – the common sense phys-
ics. As a naive physical theory enables us
to understand, and successfully navigate
through, the every-day world of material
objects, a theory of mind enables us to un-
derstand and navigate through a more
complex world – the world of social rela-
tions. Although the »two worlds«, the
physical and the social world, are but two
aspects of organism’s unique (bio-physi-
cal) environment, the later world is im-
penetrable by exclusive use of principles
pertaining to the former one. With re-
gards to the deeper, sub-personal level of
mental processing, both »theories«, how-
ever, are employed according to the same
scheme: the »quasi-theoretical« (and pre-
theoretical) understanding and/or predic-
tion of other’s mental states is part of a
tacit inference procedure. The covert men-
tal entities and their relations serve as an
implicit logical basis of the inference pro-
cess, which then – by use of variety of
(also implicit) assumptions and princi-
ples – advances to overt behaviors. Such
an inference procedure is (logically) iso-
morphic to what happens in typical cases
of a scientific explanation or/and predic-
tion – i.e., in cases of explicit inference
from invisible entities and principles to
an observed or/and expected (physical)
event.
By contrast, the simulation-theory con-
strues mind-reading as a sub-conscious
simulation routine, whereby the mind-
-reader (empathizer) understands and
predicts the target agent’s actions by vir-
tually simulating their mental correlates:
by »mirroring« agent’s intentional experi-
ences as if it were his/her own. The im-
portant point is that such simulation does
not require any kind of sophisticated con-
ceptual (»representational«) system, as is
assumed by the theory-theory. As one of
the proponents of this approach to empa-
thy states:
…the implicit, automatic, and uncon-
scious process of motor simulation ena-
bles the observer to use his/her own re-
sources to penetrate the world of other
without the need for theorizing about it,
without the need to necessarily use propo-
sitional attitudes16.
After these, mostly philosophical pre-
liminaries we want to take a closer look
at the phenomenon of empathy from a
psychological and evolutionary perspec-
tive. However, as it would be both too am-
bitious and space consuming to deal with
all its subtleties, we will concentrate on
the most important developmental and
communicative aspects of empathy, with




According to Thompson, »there is a
large amount of evidence that human in-
fants posses, at birth, interpersonal body
schemas for emotional contagion and fa-
cial imitation, and that these schemas
underlie the development of more sophis-
ticated emphatic abilities«1. Hoffman has
proposed a useful »scheme for the devel-
opment and transformation«15 of a very
primitive, non-voluntary reaction, which
he calls »empathic distress«. In particu-
lar, he suggests that the development of
the reaction »corresponds to the develop-
ment of a cognitive sense of others«. Ac-
cording to him, there are four stages of
this development:
¿ fusion, or at least a lack of clear separa-
tion between the self and the other;
¿ awareness that others are physical en-
tities distinct from the self;
¿ awareness that others have feelings and
other internal states independent of one’s
own; and
¿ awareness that others have experi-
ences beyond the immediate situation
and their own history and identity as
individuals.
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It is interesting that students of ani-
mal behavior, primatologists in particu-
lar, report a mental/behavioral pattern,
called »emotional contagion«, correspond-
ing roughly to early developmental stages
of the cognitive sense of others in hu-
mans. De Waal for instance, defines emo-
tional contagion as »total identification
without discrimination between one’s feel-
ings and those of the other«. It is impor-
tant to add that reaching a cognitive stage
of empathy in humans does not imply a
loss of its emotive component embodied
in »emotional contagion«4. In fact, the de-
velopment of the cognitive aspect of em-
pathy »parallels the occurrence of authen-
tic moral emotions of sympathy and com-
passion in which we feel genuine concern
for the Other«1.
Emergence and expression of the cog-
nitive aspect of empathy is related to the
self-concept. In regard to this kind of con-
ceptual consciousness, it is possible to di-
vide the development of empathy into two
major stages. The first stage is the stage
of mirroring other’s emotional reactions.
This stage lasts approximately until the
end of the first year of life and is charac-
terized by infant’s imitation – mostly on a
purely physiological level – of overt emo-
tional expressions of others. The infant
»cries« while observing someone else cry-
ing, or merely mimics the tear-wiping
hand motions. However, children of this
age are unable to fully conceptualize the
causes of the observed behavior (e.g., cry-
ing) – the emotional states experienced
by others. A common psychological expla-
nation for lack of such understanding
makes use of the fact that infants, before
reaching their first year of life, perceive
themselves as semi-detached from the
environment, and consequently do not
possess a full-blown self-concept. The mi-
micking behavior thus allows them to de-
velop a repertoire of »compassionate reac-
tions« triggered by perception of others’
overt emotional manifestations.
The onset of the second stage coincides
roughly with the end of the first year of
life. Acquiring an elementary self-concept
enables a child to recognize the tone and
the intrinsic causes of emotional reac-
tions of others. This ability facilitates ac-
tive empathic intervention and potential
assistance in dealing with emotions that
children of that age discern on a manifest
level. One such emotion is sadness ex-
pressed through crying which – at this
developmental stage – evokes a corre-
sponding »emotional meaning« that may
in turn elicit empathic reaction expressed
through consolation, support, offering toys,
physical contact, etc. Empathizing on this
level presupposes a prior experience of
similar emotions, which in turn requires
a developed self-concept.
In the course of maturation, ever more
precise, fine-tuned recognition of emo-
tions, i.e., of cues indicating the inner life
of another person, take place. As several
psychological and interdisciplinary stud-
ies have indicated, the degree of success-
fulness in recognizing emotions, both one’s
own and others’, is a function of chrono-
logical maturation age. These findings
are not surprising, since emotion recogni-
tion requires higher cognitive skills like
introspection, reflection, or (in cases of
verbal expression of such experiences) lin-
guistic competence. As results of various
other studies suggest, it is difficult to de-
marcate developmental phases of emo-
tion recognition, on one side, and adjust-
ment to one’s social environment, on the
other. Already in an early stage, there are
significant individual differences regard-
ing the child’s ability to recognize and
name its own emotional states and relate
them to emotional states of others. In ad-
dition to the individual’s innate cognitive
potential, key roles in the development of
empathy are played both by upbringing
and the environment. According to a
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study Barnett, King and Howard17, the
strength of empathic reaction depends on
whether a child was instructed to pay at-
tention to the emotional reaction(s) that
his/her actions elicited in another child
(»look, you were naughty to him and now
he is crying«) as opposed to being subject
to a commentary of his/her action (e.g.
»that was naughty«). It is thereby critical
to measure the intensity and the mode of
induction, and to be sure that the care-
taker’s/experimenter’s comment does not
turn into overall criticism (»you are a bad
boy«) or threat (»next time you do such a
thing you will be punished«). For, as re-
sults of a study performed by Radke-Yar-
row et al.17 suggest, in cases when inade-
quate induction modalities like criticism
or threat are applied, the desired reaction
(empathy) could be overshadowed, or
even eliminated from the mental/behav-
ioral repertoire, by feelings of fear, sorrow
or remorse.
However, there are certain controver-
sial findings related to the development
of empathy. Most interdisciplinary and
cross-cultural studies indicate that empa-
thy functions as a facilitator of altruistic
and as an inhibitor of aggressive behav-
ior. On the other side, there are stu-
dies18,19 suggesting a positive correlation
between aggression and pro-social and
empathic behavior in kindergarten kids.
According to one interpretation, aggres-
sive behavior of kindergarten children
(especially boys) is a phase in develop-
ment of assertiveness and a positive self-
-concept, in terms of taking one’s place in
the society of peers, and cannot therefore
be identified with the usual type of ag-
gressive behavior in the sense of a volun-
tary and planned infliction of pain or in-
jury. This interpretation is corroborated
by results of studies performed on pre-
-school children showing a negative cor-
relation between aggressive and pro-so-
cial behavior. As it is assumed, a higher
level of social sensitivity and recognition
of negative aspects of aggressive behavior
have already been internalized by this
age. Additional support for this explana-
tion comes from children’s own verbal re-
ports: children claim to have recognized
their own aggressive behavior, and/or the
aggressive behavior of others, labeling it
as »inappropriate reaction«.
So, generally speaking, regardless of
individual differences within each devel-
opmental phase, for a child to be able to
independently recognize communication
finesses in both verbal and non-verbal
communication, i.e., to exhibit an ade-
quate degree of empathic skill, sufficient
degree of physical and psychological ma-
turity must be reached. Once this level
has been attained (typically about school
age), it is the prevailing emotional orien-
tation that determines the degree of em-
pathizing competence. In another study20,21
school children were confronted with two
sets of videotaped emotions – one set con-
sisting of expressions of euphoric (e.g.,
happiness, pride), the other of disphoric
emotions (e.g., fear, anger, sorrow). Chil-
dren who empathized more with the eu-
phoric set were the ones who were de-
scribed by their parents and teachers as
less socially adapted and non-emphatic,
and by themselves as aggressive. On the
other hand, children who empathized more
with the disphoric set were the ones who
generally exhibited a higher level of un-
derstanding and tolerance, and a lower
level of aggression towards their peers,
teachers and parents. In this study, spe-
cial attention was given to »less empathic
children« who were subsequently trained
to develop social skills and methods of
peaceful resolution of conflicts. The re-
sults, corroborated by a number of inde-
pendent studies, indicate that through
appropriate training it is possible to
achieve a significant and constant prog-
ress in all measured values over a rela-
tively short time period (from few weeks
to several months). We can thus conclude
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that empathy is learned and acquired
through positive reinforcement. Children
who exhibit higher levels of empathy as
we defined it are generally better accepted
by their peers as well as their social envi-
ronment – parents, teachers and others.
As to the expression of empathy in
adults, research findings are rather con-
troversial. They suggest the existence of
significant individual differences in func-
tional conditions and contexts that elicit
pro-social behavior. Empathic potential
may be studied either directly: through
situational field research, or indirectly:
by measuring personality dimensions that
are negatively associated with empathic
ability. The same applies to those dimen-
sions of personality that elicit empathic
behavior, or at least provide situational
contexts for expression of such a behav-
ioral pattern. In a study conducted in
three different settings: in a city, a small-
er town, and a village, respectively, traits
such as rigidity, inadaptability, deriving
pleasure from mocking and insulting oth-
ers – a set of traits generally referred to
as »psychoticism« – have been negatively
correlated with empathic ability. Extra-
version or sociability, on the other hand
presuppose a pro-social and cooperative
behavior: increasing the number of social
contacts increases the likelihood of em-
pathic reaction. In addition, it has been
shown that cognitive abilities are a sig-
nificant differential factor related to ex-
pression of pro-social behavior in boys. It
seems plausible to expect people living in
smaller communities to be more sociable
and extraverted than those living in cit-
ies or towns, since the former are consid-
ered to be less alienated from each other
and more integrated into the social ma-
trix. However, a recent pilot study con-
ducted by one of the authors (2001/2002)
of male population ranging from 16 to 60
years of age conducted in several villages,
in a small town, and a city, respectively,
found no significant difference, neither in
extraversion nor in intelligence, in re-
spect to subjects’ dwelling place.
Communication and Deception
It has already been assumed that com-
munication should not be modeled exclu-
sively according to its linguistic guise; the
concept should rather be extended to co-
ver a whole spectrum of different types of
behavior, both verbal and non-verbal, of
different kinds of systems. If this approach
is sound – if »communication that can be
achieved by use of language is not a typi-
cal but a limiting case«22 – what is then
the common denominator of various types
of communicative interaction, both lin-
guistic and non-linguistic?
According to one of the most influen-
tial theories7, for behavior to be described
as 'communication' it is not only neces-
sary that some effect in the addressee be
produced (by her/his/its understanding of
the content of the message), but also that
the communicator’s intention to produce
this effect be recognized. (These two nec-
essary conditions taken together are as-
sumed to be sufficient for communication
to take place.) It is thus irrelevant whe-
ther the intention is produced by verbal
or non-verbal means.
Bearing this in mind, and endorsing
the above definition of empathy as affec-
tive understanding of other’s behavior as
action, i.e., as intentionally motivated, we
will take empathy to be a necessary con-
dition for understanding intentions in ge-
neral, and communicative intentions in
particular. As some authors argue, there
is a straightforward evolutionary path-
way leading from recognition of other or-
ganism’s actions – intentional modes of
behavior – to recognition of a particular
subclass of actions – those with communi-
cative intent23. In the early stages of this
(phylogenetic) development, overt bodily
movements – gestures – were presum-
ably the most efficient ways of expressing
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such intentions. Later, in the course of
evolution of human brain, the role of ges-
tures was supplemented, and eventually
almost entirely substituted by, systems of
oral signs with special syntactic proper-
ties enabling an unprecedented expan-
sion of individual’s expressive capacities.
However, the occurrence of speech had no
consequences for the basic functioning of
the communication process. For under-
standing of both gestures and speech the
recognition of gesturer’s/speaker’s (com-
municative) intentions is unavoidable.
Such recognition in turn requires corre-
sponding mind-reading (empathizing)
abilities. For, as it can aptly be illustrated
by a variety of examples, our understand-
ing of »objective meaning« of the used
signs (in typical cases) does not suffice for
efficient decoding of a gesticulatory or a
verbal message. It is the »gesturer’s/ spea-
ker’s meaning« – what he/she intends us
to understand – what we have to recog-
nize – i.e., empathize – in order to get the
message right (especially in cases of high-
ly ambiguous messages).
In short, empathy should be viewed as
a prerequisite of communication. The in-
tricate neurophysiological pathways in-
volved in empathic evaluation of the ob-
served, preempt communicative behavior
and provide it with an initial set of evalu-
ations regarding the probabilistic inten-
tions of the observed entity. Thus, it aims
to provide active advantage to its user,
enabling it to respond to another’s inten-
tion before overt action.
Citing Grammer, Filova & Fieder,
communication is » the transfer of in-
formation between two communicative
units«24. The basic element of this process
– information – is the smallest semanti-
cally significant data set. As the sender –
any entity that sends and encodes a sig-
nal – prepares to send the information, it
opens a communication channel or me-
dium for sending signals25. The channel
may be a single medium, or several media
operating simultaneously. Communication
may thus occur through any single, or a
combination of auditory, visual, tactile,
olfactory or gustatory channels. Once se-
lected for sending, information is encoded
and sent through the channel as a signal
(i.e., message). As it detects the signal,
the receiver decodes it by adding informa-
tion to it. Through the process of decod-
ing, the receiver extracts the information
contained within the signal. However, as
signals are exchanged between the sen-
der and the receiver, the reception and
decoding processes depend on the amount
of noise – stimuli interfering with the re-
ception of a signal25 – present in the com-
munication channel. It is important to
note the difference, as well as interdepen-
dence between the semantic content of a
signal and its contextual meaning. While
semantic or content level of communica-
tion refers to the explicit meaning of the
signal (i.e., the meaning of encoded infor-
mation), the relationship (i.e., contextual)
level of communication is the implied or
inferred meaning of the signal influenced
by physical, psychological, social, and
temporal factors.
The role inter-organism communica-
tion played through evolution is probably
matched in importance only by the inher-
ent principle of genetic variation creating
the variety of life on the planet. Indeed,
one cannot overlook the fact that commu-
nication, in one form or the other, is pres-
ent in, and constitutes an essential ele-
ment of, most psychological, physical and/
or sociocultural processes. In humans,
communication generally refers to sen-
der(s) stimulating meaning in the recei-
ver(s)24 while in a broader ethological
context; it refers to inter-organism ex-
change of information, using evolved pur-
pose-specific signals that influence orga-
nisms’ behavior24.
Yet, since it evolved in variably com-
plex social environments, communication
was subject to pressure of conflicting in-
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dividual interests. The most adaptive
strategy of reaching a disputed goal was
»going around«, rather than against op-
posing individual(s) since it involved re-
duced risks of injury. Deception – an or-
ganism’s ability to disguise its underlying
intentions through creation of misleading
content in a given context of communica-
tion, resulting in generation of a mislead-
ing neuronal template*** by the receiver –
is what transfigured mere information
transfer into a powerful tool of cogni-
tive-behavioral manipulation. Deception
thus evolved as an adaptive evolutionary
strategy. In order to be successful, the
sender had to minimize the expression of
deceptive cues to reduce the chance of re-
ceiver’s recognition of deception and po-
tential counter-deception26. Furthermore,
since accusation of deception (based on
receiver’s recognition of the sender’s de-
ceptive cues) was inherently hazardous27
while deception as a means of cogniti-
ve-behavioral manipulation was highly
beneficial, self-deception developed as a
means of reducing the expression of de-
ceptive cues based on the sender’s cogni-
tive awareness of the act28,29 thus shifting
the emphasis of deceptive communication
to the unconscious level.
Communication occurs on both con-
scious and unconscious level. On the lat-
ter level, senders manipulate psychophy-
siology of the receiver by means of
deception. Affect responses are triggered
by minimal stimulus inputs and involve
almost no cortical-cognitive processing30.
Deception may therefore take place on
the unconscious level of communication –
i.e., bypassing potentially conflicting cog-
nitive content and reducing cortical-cogni-
tive leakage cues – while being swiftly
and more directly communicated through
unconscious affect display cues governed
by the limbic system. The less deceptive
stimuli are cognitively processed (i.e., the
stronger they are attached to phylogenic
limbic affect display cues), the stronger
will the deceptive effects be. Deception is
more successful if communicated via un-
conscious affect display cues governed by
the limbic system since it does not invoke
the expression of potentially revealing
cues associated with cognitive processing
of deceptive information, e.g., stuttering,
fidgeting, pupil dilation etc28.
In evolutionary terms, an organism’s
ability to manipulate others’ behavior en-
hances the organism’s adaptive problem
-solving ability and increases its fit-
ness.28,29 Ability to deceive therefore car-
ries significant adaptive value. Thus, we
hypothesize that the use of evolved psy-
chophysical mechanisms of deception op-
erating on unconscious (i.e., limbic-affec-
tive), rather than conscious (i.e., cortical
-cognitive) level presents the basis for
value inculcation. The significance of un-
conscious communication lays in the fact
that it stimulates meaning on a sublimi-
nal level, allowing for potential inculca-
tion of values without the cognitive
awareness of the receiver.
Thus, not only does ability to deceive
carry adaptive value, but so does the ca-
pacity to be (self-) deceived. Furthermore,
psychopathologies marked by unusually
high (e.g., anxiety disorders) or unusually
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***For the purposes of this overview, the term neuronal template will be used to denote a reactive nerve cell as-
sembly created through repeated presentation of trigger stimuli, and providing the basis for neurophysiolo-
gical and behavioral activity. Dogmatic neuronal template denotes a neuronal template allowing exertion of
only highly limited neurophysiological and behavioral activity. The definition of dogmatic neuronal template
is based on dogmatism scale developed by M. Rokeach (1956) intended to measure closed, »authoritarian« or
»anti-democratic« attitudes expressed in various social groups, based on the wording most commonly used in
their communication. Dogmatic (i.e., indoctrinated) neuronal templates are closed in a sense that they allow
exertion of only certain specific neurophysiological and behavioral activity. Dogmatic neuronal templates are
neurophysiological basis of indoctrination.
low (e.g., depressive disorders) capacity
for self-deception should account for in-
creased ability to deceive and decode de-
ception, respectively.
Since adaptive value of deception de-
pends on it not being discovered and coun-
ter-acted, deceptive cues should be faster
and more successful if communicated via
phylogenically hard-wired, unconscious
affect display cues governed by the limbic
system. The advantage of communicating
deceptive signals unconsciously is that it
avoids expression of leakage cues stem-
ming from cortical-cognitive (i.e., con-
scious) processing of deceptive informa-
tion. As Ekman and Friesen31 argue,
affect displays constitute primary means
of social interaction. The importance of
affect in communication lay in its phy-
logenic predating of verbal communica-
tion observed in higher primates (e.g.
chimpanzees) and further supported by
findings of Ekman and Friesen of univer-
sal, basic facial affect displays (sadness,
anger, disgust, fear, interest, surprise,
happiness)32. Affect displays include a
range of nonverbal behaviors such as pro-
xemics, oculesics, kinesics, vocalics, etc.
where kinesics (i.e., gestures and move-
ments) has been shown to be related to
intent and physiological parameters of
communication24.
Communication process gives rise to
deception as an important element in ge-
nerating and maintaining one’s adaptive
communicational advantage over his/her
potential competitors. As Dawkins and
Krebs propose, presenting intentions in a
communication may be a costly mistake,
since the intentions of one organism may
be diametrically opposite from the inten-
tions of another organism34. Thus, a con-
flict situation may arise from presenta-
tion of these conflicting goals. In descri-
bing the importance and role of decep-
tion, one must bare in mind that both
natural and social setting are structural
elements constituting the environment of
evolutionary adaptedness (EEA)34. As
Cosmides and Tooby define it:
EEA is not a place or time. It is the sta-
tistical composite of selection pressures
that caused the design of an adaptation.
Thus, EEA for one adaptation may be dif-
ferent from that for another.34
Thus, in evaluating the evolution of
inter-organism communication, one is
confronted with the single functional
principle – EEA. Communication and de-
ception should, due to their great adap-
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Fig. 1. Schematic representation of the two-pathway theory of communication through empathic
understanding of Other’s behavior.
tive value, be highly determined by the
EEA. This point is taken a step further
when discussing social environments
marked with conflicting interests of indi-
vidual organisms inhabiting them35. The-
refore, an adaptation to the social aspect
of the EEA, in which a great deal of the
organism’s well-being and prospects of
maintaining favorable contingencies for
survival and reproduction, depending on
its communication with other members of
the group, would be a necessity. These or-
ganisms would therefore need to develop
a means of concealing their intentions or
any psychophysical features that might
negatively reflect on (a) the achievement
of a short-term goal and (b) the chances of
reproduction in the long run. Having the
EEA principle in mind, deception is mere-
ly an adaptive response to the demands
set upon an individual organism by the
environment. Just like various species
(e.g. Hyla arenicolor, or the canyon free
frog)36 develop highly adaptive cryptic co-
loration allowing them to blend with the
environment and thus escape the preda-
tor, the rules of social interaction and
communication produce avid examples of
deceptive behaviors allowing the organ-
isms applying them to conceal their in-
tentions and thus bypass potential goal
-inhibiting social-interactive obstacles (e.
g. the Head Akimbo)24. Deception there-
fore creates an obvious adaptive advan-
tage for the sender (e.g., misleading a po-
tential foe), connecting it directly to the
probability of the organism’s goal achie-
vement, successful reproduction and sur-
vival. As Grammer and others propose,
situation in which communication is a
function of deception defines the commu-
nication paradox:
The manipulative component of a sig-
nal has to force the receiver into a certain
state where he is willingly accepting the
goals of the sender, preferably without rec-
ognizing that he was manipulated.24
As the EEA logic dictates, the ultimate
goal of deception is to misinform the or-
ganism’s potential foe(s). Ultimately, that
would mean that the more an organism
deceives its potential foes or rivals, the
lower the probability of the foes’ or rivals’
endangering the underlying intentions of
the organism, and the greater the organ-
ism’s adaptive gain from deceptive behav-
ior. We may thus conclude that the ulti-
mate goal of deception could be the ge-
neration of a dogmatic neuronal template
through persistent exposure to deceptive
signal(s). Emergence of complexity in so-
cial relations – from individual, over fam-
ily, to population levels – invariably dic-
tates the emergence of strategies and
counter-strategies aimed at increasing
individual/group adaptation to a new so-
cial matrix. Furthermore, developing
complexity of socio-cultural relations, the
resulting adaptive strategies and the
summary influence these will on the en-
vironment form a system wherein manip-
ulation of a single or a set of variables
will influence the yield of the system37,38.
In very much the same way, these trends
will be manifested in inbreeding within
populations as well as prevalence of vari-
ous diseases within isolated popula-
tions39.
As Nesse and Lloyd argue, deception
and self-deception (i.e., psychodynamic
mechanisms) are highly adaptive strate-
gies that evolved as a response to the
need for maintaining reciprocity and long-
-term relationships40. They argue further
that psychodynamic mechanisms (e.g.,
repression) developed as means of reduc-
ing the relative importance of perceptions
that could have negative effect on the
maintenance of reciprocity or long-term
relationships. Thus, one may summarize
this perspective in three lines: people de-
ceive each other, deception can be de-
tected, and self-deception (e.g., repres-
sion) assists in deceiving others40. In other
words, if one is able to deceive oneself to
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the point of believing (i.e., repressing mal-
adaptive cognitive material), one will be
more successful in deceiving others since
he/she will display fewer nonverbal leak-
age cues.
Discussion
Leaning on both historical and con-
temporary theories, we have assumed
that empathy is a mode of pre-conscious
understanding – understanding of an
agent’s intentionally steered behavior. In
fact, mutual recognition of covert mental
motivations of overt bodily movements
can be regarded as the first step in the
formation of a communication channel
between two (or more) empathizing agents.
Empathic understanding does not neces-
sarily entail recognition of agent’s real in-
tentions. As one can falsely understand a
language sentence, ascribing to it false
meaning – i.e., falsely understanding what
the communicator has intended us to un-
derstand – so can an agent’s behavior be
misunderstood too. Moreover, it is some-
times in agent’s best interest to elicit
false understanding of his/her/its actions/
intentions, whereby the mechanism of ef-
fecting such an interpretation – the de-
ception mechanism – does not have to be
consciously controlled. Based on empiri-
cal evidence reported in the current liter-
ature, we have shown how deception may
be achieved on both conscious and uncon-
scious processing levels. While conscious
processing requires information to be re-
peatedly presented to the host, until it be-
comes »rationalized« as the »most impor-
tant«, referential instance of information,
unconscious processing makes use of
evolved affect display cues. Pairing affect
display cues with communicated informa-
tion allows it to be processed unconsci-
ously by the limbic system.
The emergence and expression of the
consciously controlled empathic ability is
related to the self-concept. In regard to
this kind of conceptual consciousness, it
is possible to divide the development of
empathy into two major stages. The first
stage, the stage of »mirroring« other’s emo-
tional reactions, lasts approximately un-
til the end of the first year of life and is
characterized by infant’s imitation – most-
ly on a purely physiological level – of
overt emotional expressions of others. The
mimicking behavior thus allows them to
develop a repertoire of »compassionate
reactions« triggered by perception of oth-
ers’ overt emotional manifestations. The
second stage coincides with the end of the
first year of life and entails acquisition of
an elementary self-concept enabling a
child to recognize the tone and intrinsic
causes of others’ emotional reactions. Ge-
nerally speaking, regardless of individual
differences within each developmental
phase, a sufficient degree of physical and
psychological maturity must be reached
for a child to be able to independently rec-
ognize communication finesses in both
verbal and non-verbal communication.
Once this level has been attained (typi-
cally about school age), it is the prevailing
emotional orientation that determines the
degree of empathizing competence.
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EMPATIJA, KOMUNIKACIJA, OBMANJIVANJE
S A @ E T A K
Empatiju shva}amo kao na~in razumijevanja koje se odvija na podsvjesnoj razini
mentalnog procesiranja. Spoznajni elementi empati~kog razumijevanja mogu se tek
apstraktno odvojiti od emotivne reakcije za koju su vezani. Prepoznavanjem srodnog
nam bi}a mi ga nesvjesno prepoznajemo tj. suosje}amo s njim. Prepoznavanje skri-
venih motiva promatranog pona{anja prvi je korak u otvaranju komunikacijskog ka-
nala izme|u dvije (ili vi{e) jedinki. No, budu}i da se komunikacija evolucijski razvijala
u slo`enim dru{tvenim okoli{ima, bila je izlo`ena selekcijskom pritisku me|usobno su-
protstavljenih pojedina~nih interesa. Tako je nastalo obmanjivanje (decepcija) kao evo-
lucijski adaptivna strategija pona{anja. Empatijsko razumijevanje, dakle, ne podrazu-
mijeva prepoznavanje stvarnih namjera jedinke – varati se mo`e svjesno i nesvjesno.
Ontogenetski gledano, va`no je posti}i potrebnu razinu biopsihosocijalnog razvoja koji
ve} u dje~joj dobi omogu}ava neovisno prepoznavanje finesa verbalne i neverbalne komu-
nikacije. Nakon postizanja tog stupnja biopsihosocijalnog razvoja, empatijski potencijal
pojedinca ovisit }e ponajvi{e o njegovoj/njezinoj dominantnoj emotivnoj orijentaciji.
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